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ROCK v. ARKANSAS: AN INDIVIDUAL INQUIRY
APPROACH TO THE ADMISSIBILITY OF
HYPNOTICALLY INDUCED
TESTIMONY
The United States Constitution affords American citizens due process
prior to a deprivation of life, liberty, or property.' Although due process is
"flexible," 2 the United States Supreme Court has held that due process re-
quires at a minimum notice and an opportunity for a hearing.3 The opportu-
nity to be heard includes the opportunity to present evidence in one's
defense,4 and restrictions on this right violate due process.5 The Constitu-
tion also guarantees criminal defendants the right to confront witnesses
against them.6 Consequently, the sixth amendment confrontation clause
might restrict the right of a party to present evidence where presenting such
evidence violates the defendant's right to confront witnesses." Likewise,
state and federal rules of procedure and evidence may prohibit a party from
presenting evidence.' Where a state's evidentiary rule prohibits a criminals
defendant from testifying to posthypnotic recall, however, the United States
Supreme Court, in Rock v. Arkansas,9 has held that such a limit violates the
defendant's due process right to present evidence on her own behalf.'0
In Rock, the Court considered whether a state per se evidentiary rule ex-
cluding posthypnotic testimony violated the petitioner's constitutional right
1. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
2. Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481 (1972). The Court stated that "due process is
flexible and calls for such procedural protections as the particular situation demands." Id.
3. See, e.g., Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123 (1951). Justice
Frankfurter, one of five Justices concurring in the decision, noted that one "in jeopardy of
serious loss" requires "notice of the case against him and opportunity to meet it." Id. at 171-
72 (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
4. See, e.g., In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257 (1948). The Court held that a person's right to be
heard includes "a right to examine the witnesses against him, to offer testimony, and to be
represented by counsel." Id. at 273.
5. See, e.g., Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 264 (1970).
6. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
7. See, e.g., Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56 (1980). The Court noted that the confrontation
clause may restrict the introduction of admissible hearsay evidence where the declarant is
available and where the hearsay statement lacks trustworthiness, Id. at 65.
8. See, e.g., FED. R. EVID. 802.
9. 107 S. Ct. 2704 (1987).
10. Id. at 2714.
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to present her defense." The state charged the petitioner with manslaughter
when a gun went off during a struggle between the petitioner and her hus-
band, shooting her husband.12 Because the petitioner could not remember
the exact details of the struggle, she submitted to hypnosis to refresh her
memory. 13 As a result of the hypnosis, the petitioner recalled that although
she held her thumb on the gun's hammer, she did not have her finger on the
trigger and that the gun had fired when her husband grabbed her arm.1 4
Testimony by an expert corroborated this version of events based on a deter-
mination that the gun was defective and likely to fire when hit or dropped.1 5
At trial, the court limited the petitioner's testimony to matters she
remembered prior to the hypnotic session.16 On appeal from her conviction
of manslaughter, 17 the Arkansas Supreme Court affirmed the holding of the
trial court. 8 The court reasoned that because of the inherent unreliability of
hypnotically refreshed testimony, the dangers of admitting such testimony
outweighed its probative value.19 Thus, the Arkansas Supreme Court fol-
lowed the jurisdictions holding posthypnotic testimony inadmissible per se.2°
Moreover, the Arkansas Supreme Court determined that a defendant's
fundamental right to testify is not limitless.2 ' The court held that standard
rules of evidence2 2 mandated the restriction of the petitioner's testimony,23
and found no constitutional violations in this limit.24 The United States
11. Id, at 2714-15.
12. Id. at 2706.
13. Id.
14. Id. at 2707.
15. Id.
16. Id. The court's pretrial order limited Rock's testimony to "matters remembered and
stated to the examiner prior to being placed under hypnosis." Id. at 2707 n.3. As a result of
this restriction, the trial court excluded virtually all of petitioner's testimony. Id.
17. Id. at 2707.
18. Rock v. State, 288 Ark. 566, 581, 708 S.W.2d 78, 86 (1986).
19. Id. at 573, 708 S.W.2d at 81. The court found hypnotically refreshed testimony unre-
liable because of the subject's tendency to confabulate, or invent facts where gaps exist in
recall. Id. at 572, 708 S.W.2d at 81; see also infra note 53.
20. Rock, 288 Ark. at 575, 708 S.W.2d at 83. The Arkansas Supreme Court relied on
People v. Shirley, 31 Cal. 3d 18, 641 P.2d 775, 181 Cal. Rptr. 243, cert. denied, 458 U.S. 1125
(1982). See infra notes 130-40 and accompanying text.
21. Rock, 288 Ark. at 578, 708 S.W.2d at 84.
22. Id. at 579, 708 S.W.2d at 85. The Arkansas Supreme Court commented that defend-
ants must abide by rules of evidence, such as the exclusion of "evidence that is prejudicial,
confusing, misleading, cumulative or time consuming." Id. at 578, 708 S.W.2d at 85. The
court determined that hypnotically induced testimony may mislead the jury because the unreli-
ability of hypnosis may outweigh its probative value. Id. at 579, 708 S.W.2d at 85.
23. Id. at 579, 708 S.W.2d at 85.
24. Id. at 580, 708 S.W.2d at 86.
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Supreme Court granted certiorari2" to determine the constitutionality of Ar-
kansas' per se exclusionary rule.
Writing for the majority, 26 Justice Blackmun held that the state could not
arbitrarily restrict a criminal defendant's constitutional right to testify in his
own defense.2 7 The Court found the Arkansas court's per se exclusionary
rule overly restrictive because the rule barred all posthypnotic testimony and
did not allow for an individual determination of admissibility of such testi-
mony.2" Although the Court agreed that hypnotically refreshed testimony
could produce unreliable evidence, it suggested procedural safeguards to re-
duce these inaccuracies.29 Moreover, the Court looked to traditional means
of determining the accuracy of testimony, such as corroboration and cross-
examination."a Because hypnotically induced testimony could be reliable in
a particular case, the Court held Arkansas' per se exclusionary rule an arbi-
trary restriction on a defendant's right to testify.3" The Court vacated the
Arkansas Supreme Court's judgment and remanded the case, instructing the
trial court to consider petitioner's argument for admissibility.3 2
The dissent, written by Chief Justice Rehnquist, asserted that the trial
court properly limited the petitioner's testimony. The dissent agreed with
the Arkansas Supreme Court's analysis, finding that a defendant's right to
present a defense is subject to "reasonable restrictions. '3' The dissent found
the restriction reasonable because the dissenters agreed that posthypnotic
testimony involves suggestion and increased confidence, and thus is inher-
ently unreliable.34 Moreover, because procedural safeguards do not guaran-
tee reliability, the dissent found acceptable the trial court's limitation on the
petitioner's testimony.3 5
This Note will analyze the therapeutic and legal uses of hypnosis and will
discuss the problems inherent in the hypnotic process. Next, the Note will
discuss the approaches the state and federal courts have employed when
faced with the admissibility of hypnotically induced testimony. It then will
25, Rock v. Arkansas, 107 S. Ct. 430, 431 (1986).
26. Rock v. Arkansas, 107 S. Ct. 2704 (1987). The Court was divided five-to-four with
retired Justice Lewis Powell in the majority. Id. at 2706.
27. Id. at 2714. The Court found constitutional support for the right to testify in the due
process clause of the fourteenth amendment, as well as in the fifth and sixth amendments. Id.
at 2709-10; see also infra notes 179-83 and accompanying text.
28. Rock, 107 S. Ct. at 2711.
29. Id. at 2714; see also infra note 208.
30. Rock, 107 S. Ct. at 2714.
31. Id.
32. Id. at 2714-15.
33. Id. at 2715-16 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
34. Id. at 2715 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
35. Id. (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting); see also infra notes 220-29.
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analyze the approach the Supreme Court has espoused recently and will
demonstrate how the Court has expanded criminal defendants' use of post-
hypnotic testimony by denouncing the per se inadmissible rule as too far-
reaching. This Note agrees with the Rock Court's balancing approach and
urges the admissibility of hypnotically induced testimony in an effort to pres-
ent all relevant evidence.
I. THE USE OF HYPNOSIS IN THE SCIENTIFIC SETTING
A. The Origins and Uses of Hypnosis
The word "hypnosis" derives from the Greek word hypnos, which means
sleep.36 Initially, the public associated hypnosis with mysterious rituals
rather than with valid medical techniques 37 and as a result, many miscon-
ceptions concerning the nature of hypnosis have emerged.38 In 1958, the
American Medical Association Council on Mental Health accepted hypnosis
as a viable means of medical therapy, 39 and the use of hypnosis today is
widespread.'
Where a person suffers from amnesia,41 hypnosis often aids that person's
36. H. ARONS, HYPNOSIS IN CRIMINAL INVESTIGATION 11 (1967).
37. Id. at 10. The birth of hypnosis dates back to the eighteenth century work of Franz
Anton Mesmer. According to Mesmer, hypnosis involved an "invisible fluid which pervaded
the body and which could be manipulated by magnets or magnetized objects." Id. at 12. In
addition, a medical hypnosis specialist has suggested that the Old Testament contains the earli-
est description of hypnosis:
And the Lord God caused a deep sleep to fall upon Adam, and he slept; and He took
one of his ribs, and closed up the flesh inside thereof; and the rib, which the Lord
God had taken from the man, made he a woman, and brought her unto the man.
Comment, Hypnosis: Understanding Its Use in the Criminal Process, 11 TEX. TECH. L. REV.
113, 114 n.2 (1979) (quoting Genesis 2:21-22).
38. Contrary to popular belief, the hypnotized subject is neither asleep nor unconscious
during the hypnotic state, and is more atuned to his surroundings than a nonhypnotized indi-
vidual. Comment, supra note 37, at 120.
39. Council on Mental Health, Medical Use of Hypnosis, 168 J. A.M.A. 186, 187 (1958).
40. Today the medical community uses hypnosis to reduce labor pains and to effectuate
surgery. Note, The Continuing Controversy of Hypnosis in the Legal Setting-The Need for a
More Flexible Approach, 12 MEM. ST. U.L. REV. 471, 473 (1982). Hypnosis also is useful as
an anesthetic and in treating mental disorders. Spector & Foster, Admissibility of Hypnotic
Statements: Is the Law of Evidence Susceptible?, 38 OHIO ST. L.J. 567, 567 (1977).
Many commentators also recognize forms of hypnosis in everyday life. See id. at 567 (lull-
ing a baby to sleep and advertising are hypnotic phenomena); H. ARONS, supra note 36, at 18
(suggestion is a common element in politics); W. BRYAN, LEGAL ASPECTS OF HYPNOSIS 5
(1969) ("extension of concentration" characteristic of hypnosis is an element of many
religions).
41. Many types of amnesia exist. The medical profession has employed hypnosis in treat-
ing the following kinds of amnesia: congrade amnesia (complete loss of recall of the event),
retrograde amnesia (diminished recall of events preceding the incident), and anterograde am-
[Vol. 37:11711174
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memory recall.42 Although traditionally used as a therapeutic tool for am-
nesia, experts now employ hypnosis where the subject does not demonstrate
pathological memory loss. 43 A victim of, or witness to a crime, who suffers a
memory loss as a result of the experience, may submit to hypnosis to refresh
his memory. Critics, however, doubt the accuracy of information elicited
through this process.'
B. The Accuracy of Hypnosis
The process of hypnosis elicits details.45 However, many of the side ef-
fects inherent in the hypnotic process, such as heightened suggestibility,46
confabulation,47 pseudomemories,4 s the subject's inability to distinguish be-
tween fact and fantasy,49 and the subject's desire to gain approbation from
the hypnotist,"0 may affect the accuracy of these details. Therefore, experts
have criticized this process.
Scientists agree that subjects under hypnosis are prone to suggestibility.5 '
The hypnotist often asks the subject leading questions to which the subject
responds with "created memory."" Where the subject has gaps in his recol-
lection, he may confabulate,53 or fill in the missing pieces with information
nesia (recall impairment of events taking place after the incident). Spector & Foster, supra
note 40, at 572.
42. Orne, The Use and Misuse of Hypnosis in Court, 27 INT'L J. CLINICAL & EXPERIMEN-
TAL HYPNOSIS 311, 323 (1979). Hypnotic techniques include age regression, wherein the sub-
ject actually relives a past event; posthypnotic suggestion, wherein the subject may recall
events once he no longer is hypnotized; and hypermnesia, wherein the subject recalls informa-
tion while under hypnosis. Spector & Foster, supra note 40, at 572-74.
43. Orne, supra note 42, at 324.
44. See Diamond, Inherent Problems in the Use of Pretrial Hypnosis on a Prospective Wit-
ness, 68 CALIF. L. REV. 313, 314 (1980); Dywan & Bowers, The Use of Hypnosis to Enhance
Recall, 222 SCIENCE 184, 185 (1983).
45. See Orne, supra note 42, at 326.
46. See Comment, Hypnosis-Its Role and Current Admissibility in the Criminal Law, 17
WILLAMETrE L. REV. 665, 667 (1981).
47. See infra note 53.
48. See infra note 55 and accompanying text.
49. See Diamond, supra note 44, at 314.
50. See Orne, supra note 42, at 326.
51. See Henderson, The Admissibility of Hypnotically Enhanced Testimony: Have the
Courts Been Mesmerized 6 J. LEGAL MED. 293, 300 (1985). Suggestibility is a "state of mind
which is conducive to the acceptance of suggestion." H. ARONS, supra note 36, at 15. Sugges-
tions are found in both tone of voice and body language. Note, Admissibility of Hypnotically
Enhanced Testimony in Louisiana, 44 LA. L. REV. 1039, 1044 (1984). Clinical studies show
that the subjects most prone to suggestibility are between seven and eight years old, female
rather than male, and have a high intelligence level. See Comment, supra note 46, at 667-68.
52. Orne, supra note 42, at 323.
53. Confabulation is the process of filling gaps in memory with inaccurate or fictitious
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that was likely to have happened.54 This confabulation results in
pseudomemories, which the individual believes are his true recollections.55
Moreover, because neither the subject nor the hypnotist can distinguish be-
tween actual recall and confabulation, commentators have criticized the ac-
curacy of the hypnotic process.
56
Commentators additionally fault the hypnotic process because subjects be-
come confident in recalling events even where such recall is erroneous.5 7
Studies show that once a subject makes a statement either under hypnosis or
following hypnosis, he will not alter that statement.5" This particular char-
acteristic of hypnosis has spawned criticism because of its effect on cross-
examination.59 Cross-examination assists the trier of fact in assessing a wit-
ness' reliability.6° However, because a hypnotized subject believes that the
recalled memory is his own experience, even if the recollection results from
confabulation, critics assert that the subject has become immune to cross-
examination. 6 1 Consequently, critics argue that this heightened confidence
deprives the defendant of his sixth amendment right to confront that
witness.62
Critics further doubt the reliability of posthypnotic testimony because the
subject may desire to please the hypnotist, and thus may alter responses ac-
cording to the degree of approbation that the hypnotist displays. 63 Addi-
information. Dilloff, The Admissibility of Hypnotically Influenced Testimony, 4 OHIO N.U.L.
REV. 1, 4 n.13 (1977).
54. Orne, supra note 42, at 321.
55. Id. at 322-23.
56. See Note, supra note 51, at i 044.
57. See Smith, Hypnotic Memory Enhancement of Witnesses: Does it Work?, 94 PSYCHO-
LOGICAL BULL. 387, 398-99 (1983). In a clinical study of both hypnotized and nonhypnotized
subjects, hypnotized subjects made more errors, yet their confidence level was as high as that
of nonhypnotized subjects. Id.
58. See Levitt, The Use of Hypnosis to "Freshen" the Memory of Witnesses or Victims, 17
TRIAL 56, 58 (1981).
59. See Falk, Posthypnotic Testimony- Witness Competency and the Fulcrum of Proce-
dural Safeguards, 57 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 30, 50 (1982); Orne, supra note 42, at 332; Ruffra,
Hypnotically Induced Testimony: Should It Be Admitted?, 19 CRIM. L. BULL. 293, 313 (1983);
Note, The Use of Hypnosis to Refresh Memory: Invaluable Tool or Dangerous Device?, 60
WASH. U.L.Q. 1059, 1072 (1982).
60. Orne, supra note 42, at 332.
61. See Note, supra note 59, at 1072.
62. The sixth amendment provides that an accused has the right "to be confronted with
the witnesses against him." U.S. CONST. amend. VI. Where a witness agrees to hypnosis,
however, his original memory may be clouded or entirely lost, which may deprive the defend-
ant of his right to confront that witness. See Falk, supra note 59, at 54.
63. Orne, supra note 42, at 326. Orne explains that the hypnotic process includes positive
reinforcement from the hypnotist, including comments such as, "You are doing well." If after
responding to a question, the hypnotist does not give a verbal sign of approbation, the subject
will try another response that will elicit an approval. Id.
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tionally, studies show that while hypnotized subjects remember an increased
number of meaningful items, their responses also include more incorrect
statements.' While many criticize the use of hypnosis as a method of ob-
taining accurate information, the technique nonetheless reveals relevant
evidence.
II. THE USE OF HYPNOSIS IN THE LEGAL SETTING: A TREND AWAY
FROM PER SE ADMISSIBILITY
The use of hypnosis in the legal setting was a rarity until the 1950's.65 In
the first case to discuss the use of hypnotism, People v. Ebanks, 66 the defend-
ant denied his guilt while under hypnosis.67 The hypnotist attempted to tes-
tify as to the defendant's statements, however the court sustained an
objection to the testimony and noted that "[tihe law of the United States
does not recognize hypnotism."68 This case established a trend of judicial
hostility toward the use of hypnosis in the legal community.6 9
The legal community employs hypnosis in four contexts: the in-court tes-
timony of a witness, victim, or defendant made while under hypnosis;7' the
out-of-court statements made while under hypnosis; the in-court testimony
of the hypnotist; and the in-court testimony of a witness whose memory has
been refreshed to recall critical events.7" In criminal prosecutions, counsel
use hypnosis to obtain additional evidence and introduce this evidence as
direct testimony.72
The use of hypnosis as an investigatory tool to develop new sources of
information has received acceptance.73 By contrast, however, the use of
64. In a recent experiment, hypnotized subjects recalled twice as many items, but made
three times as many errors. See Dywan & Bowers, supra note 44, at 185.
65. Of the reported American cases between 1915 and 1950, only one concerned hypnosis.
See Spector & Foster, supra note 40, at 579 n.67.
66. 117 Cal. 652, 49 P. 1049 (1897).
67. Id. at 656, 49 P. at 1053.
68. Id., 49 P. at 1053.
69. See Note, Hypnotically Induced Testimony: Credibility versus Admissibility, 57 IND.
L.J. 349, 353 (1982).
70. Although statements a defendant makes while under hypnosis generally are inadmissi-
ble, the court allowed the in-court hypnotism of a defendant in an unreported case. The de-
fendant was hypnotized in court, without the presence of the jury. Under hypnosis, the
defendant recalled that he shot his wife after seeing her with another man. This was the first
time a court permitted the use of hypnotism in the courtroom. However, this case did not
raise the issue of the admissibility of pretrial hypnotic statements. See H. ARONS, supra note
36, 106-08 (discussing State v. Nebb, No. 39,540 (Ohio C.P., Franklin County, May 28, 1962)).
71. See Note, supra note 40, at 475.
72. See Alderman & Barrette, Hypnosis on Trial: A Practical Perspective on the Applica-
tion of Forensic Hypnosis in Criminal Cases, 18 CRIM. L. BULL. 5, 9-10 (1982).
73. Id. "That hypnosis has significant value for investigative purposes is widely accepted
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hypnosis as testimony has given rise to disagreements. Judicial treatment of
the use of hypnosis as admissible evidence has varied. Generally, states have
adopted one of three approaches in deciding whether to admit hypnotically
induced testimony: 1) the testimony is per se admissible because hypnosis
only affects credibility, which the fact-finder determines; 74 2) the testimony
is admissible if the hypnotic session follows procedural safeguards; 75 or 3)
the testimony is inadmissible per se, although matters recalled prior to hyp-
nosis may be admitted.76
A. Per Se Admissibility: Credibility, Not Admissibility
In Harding v. State, 77 the first decision discussing the pretrial use of hyp-
nosis to enhance a witness' memory, 78 the Maryland Court of Special Ap-
peals held admissible a victim's hypnotically induced testimony.79 In
Harding, the victim was shot and raped and could not remember the events
that occurred after the shooting."0 A psychologist hypnotized the victim out
of court in an effort to refresh the victim's memory. Under hypnosis, the
victim identified the defendant as her attacker."' At trial, the victim testified
to what she recalled under hypnosis. Because the victim testified that she
remembered the events that she described under hypnosis, and the hypnotist
testified that he made "no improper suggestions" during the hypnotic proce-
dure, the court allowed the testimony.82 According to the court, a witness'
use of hypnosis to achieve present recollection was a "question of the weight
of the evidence" 3 for the trier of fact to determine.8 4 Harding became a
trend-setting decision espousing the admissible per se rule of hypnotically
induced testimony.8 5
by the courts and both by proponents and opponents of evidentiary applications." Note, supra
note 51, at 1042 (footnotes omitted).
74. See cases cited infra note 85.
75. See cases cited infra note 97.
76. See cases cited infra note 123.
77. 5 Md. App. 230, 246 A.2d 302 (1968), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 949 (1969).
78. See Henderson, supra note 51, at 306.
79. 5 Md. App. at 236, 246 A.2d at 306.
80. Id. at 233-34, 246 A.2d at 305.
81. Id. at 234-35, 246 A.2d at 304-05.
82. Id. at 246, 246 A.2d at 311.
83. Id. at 236, 246 A.2d at 306.
84. Proponents of this rule argue that traditional means of testing credibility, including
cross-examining the witness and revealing to the jury the risks involved in hypnosis, enable the
jury to evaluate properly the hypnotized witness' credibility. See, e.g., State v. Peoples, 311
N.C. 515, 524-25, 319 S.E.2d 177, 183 (1984).
85. States following the Harding approach include: Florida, Clark v. State, 379 So. 2d
372, 375-76 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1979) (the credibility of the witness' posthypnotic identifica-
tion of the defendant was for the jury to decide); Indiana, Pearson v. State, 441 N.E.2d 468,
1178 [Vol. 37:1171
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Harding and its progeny contend that hypnosis falls within the traditional
methods of refreshing a witness' present recollection. Just as a witness may
refresh his recollection by reading a memorandum, so too may he refresh his
recollection by submitting to hypnosis.86 A concern with using any form of
present memory refreshment, however, is that the witness merely may agree
with information in the writing, rather than actually experience a revival of
memory. 7 Despite this risk, courts generally allow a witness to refresh his
recollection. 8
Although the Harding approach was once the "universal view of the
courts, ' 9 critics agree that the court's analysis was too simplistic.90 The
Harding court failed to address the problems attributable to the hypnotic
process. For example, the court assumed that the victim's posthypnotic tes-
timony was both accurate and reliable, but did not discuss the possibility of
confabulation 9' or memory distortion.92 Although the victim's prehypnosis
account of the events conflicted with her posthypnotic recollection,93 the
court allowed the jury to weigh this discrepancy in determining the witness'
473 (Ind. 1982) (hypnosis does not per se disqualify the witness but is a matter for the trier of
fact to consider); North Dakota, State v. Brown, 337 N.W.2d 138, 151 (N.D. 1983) ("hypnosis
affects credibility but not admissibility"); Oregon, State v. Jorgensen, 8 Or. App. 1, 9, 492 P.2d
312, 315 (1971) (objections to hypnosis go to the weight, not to the admissibility of evidence);
Tennessee, State v. Glebock, 616 S.W.2d 897, 903-04 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1981); and Wyoming,
Chapman v. State, 638 P.2d 1280, 1282 (Wyo. 1982).
Federal courts also have adhered to the Harding approach. Kline v. Ford Motor Co., 523
F.2d 1067, 1069 (9th Cir. 1975) (memory refreshed by hypnosis affects credibility of testimony,
not witness competency); Wyller v. Fairchild Hiller Corp., 503 F.2d 506, 509 (9th Cir. 1974)
(weight to be given to hypnotically induced testimony is for the jury to determine); United
States v. Awkard, 597 F.2d 667, 669 (9th Cir.) (hypnosis may affect credibility of evidence, but
not admissibility), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 885 (1979); United States v. Adams, 581 F.2d 193,
198 (9th Cir.) (hypnosis affects credibility but not admissibility), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1006
(1978); United States v. Waksal, 539 F. Supp. 834, 838 (S.D. Fla. 1982), rev'd on other
grounds, 709 F.2d 653 (1 1th Cir. 1983); United States v. Narciso, 446 F. Supp. 252, 284 (E.D.
Mich. 1977) (the jury is to determine the credibility of a witness who testifies after undergoing
hypnosis).
86. C. MCCORMICK, MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 9 (3d ed. 1984). McCormick explains
that it is accepted practice for a witness to refresh his recollection by inspecting a memoran-
dum at trial. When the witness has revived recollection by inspecting the exhibit, he testifies
from his present recollection revived, not from the exhibit. The exhibit itself becomes the
testimony, however, where the witness' memory is not revived from inspecting the exhibit, and
the witness displays past recollection recorded. Id. at 18; see also FED. R. EViD. 612 (permit-
ting a writing to refresh a witness' memory).
87. See Falk, supra note 59, at 54.
88. See, e.g., Kline, 523 F.2d at 1069-70; Wyller, 503 F.2d at 509-10.
89. Henderson, supra note 51, at 310.
90. See infra notes 97, 123, and accompanying text.
91. See supra note 53.
92. See Dilloff, supra note 53, at 19.
93. Before hypnosis, the victim told the police that three black males had raped her; how-
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credibility.94 As courts have become more familiar with the problems inher-
ent in hypnosis, they have become less willing to accept Harding's per se
admissibility rule and instead have adopted either an approach that employs
procedural safeguards 95 or a per se inadmissible approach.
96
B. Procedural Safeguards.- Conditional Admissibility
Some courts follow a middle ground between automatic admissibility and
per se inadmissibility and admit hypnotically induced testimony provided
that the parties used procedural safeguards in the hypnotic process. 97 These
courts support the analysis the New Jersey Supreme Court set forth in State
v. Hurd. 98 In Hurd, a victim's hypnotic session resulted in her identification
of the defendant. 99 In deciding whether to admit her posthypnotic testi-
mony, the court emphasized the unreliability of such testimony.,°°
Although the court recognized the inherent dangers in the hypnotic process,
such as suggestibility and increased confidence resulting in ineffective cross-
examination, it held that a rule of per se inadmissability was "unnecessarily
broad and [would] result in the exclusion of evidence that [was] as trustwor-
thy as other eyewitness testimony."' 0 ' To lessen these inherent dangers, the
court adopted procedural requirements based on those suggested by Dr.
Martin Orne, a leading expert in hypnosis.102 Because the hypnotic session
ever, after hypnosis, she identified only Harding as the one involved. Harding v. State, 5 Md.
App. 230, 233-35, 246 A.2d 302, 304-05 (1968), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 949 (1969).
94. Id. at 236, 246 A.2d at 306.
95. See cases cited infra note 97.
96. See cases cited infra note 123.
97. States employing procedural safeguards include: Mississippi, House v. State, 445 So.
2d 815, 826-27 (Miss. 1984); New Jersey, State v. Hurd, 86 N.J. 525, 545-46, 432 A.2d 86, 96-
97 (1981); New Mexico, State v. Beachum, 97 N.M. 682, 689-90, 643 P.2d 246, 253-54 (1981);
Ohio, State v. Weston, 16 Ohio App. 3d 279, 287, 475 N.E.2d 805, 813 (1984); Washington
State v. Long, 32 Wash. App. 732, 737, 649 P.2d 845, 847 (1982); and Wisconsin, State v.
Armstrong, 110 Wis. 2d 555, 571, 329 N.W.2d 386, 394, cert. denied, 461 U.S. 946 (1983).
A federal civil case, Sprynczynatyk v. General Motors Corp., 771 F.2d 1112, 1122-23 (8th
Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1046 (1986), also followed this approach. Interestingly, the
Ninth Circuit, which followed Harding, first suggested procedural safeguards: "We think that,
at a minimum, complete stenographic records of interviews of hypnotized persons who later
testify should be maintained." United States v. Adams, 581 F.2d 193, 199 n. 12 (9th Cir.), cert.
denied, 439 U.S. 1006 (1978).
98. 86 N.J. 525, 432 A.2d 86 (1981).
99. Id. at 531, 432 A.2d at 89.
100. Id. at 536, 432 A.2d at 91.
101. Id. at 541, 432 A.2d at 94.
102. Id. at 545, 432 A.2d at 96. Orne proposed the following procedural safeguards in the
hypnosis of a witness:
1. A psychiatrist or psychologist with special training in hypnosis should carry out the hyp-
nosis. The hypnotist should not have any involvement in the investigation of the case.
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did not follow these procedures, 113 the Hurd court disallowed the post-
hypnotic testimony."
In an effort to include reliable hypnotically-induced testimony, the Hurd
court held that where the hypnosis was "reasonably likely to result in recall
comparable in accuracy to normal human memory,"10 5 the trial court
should admit the testimony. This proposition has prompted debate concern-
ing the similarity between ordinary and hypnotic recall."°6 Although the
courts generally admit eyewitness testimony, this testimony often suffers reli-
ability problems similar to those of hypnotically refreshed recall. An eyewit-
ness may alter his memory to suit the available suspects" or may fabricate
portions of his memory to make a "chaotic memory seem more plausi-
2. All contact between the psychiatrist or psychologist and the subject should be videotaped.
Prior to hypnosis, the witness should describe the facts as he remembers them.
3. Only the hypnotist and the subject should be present before and during the hypnotic
session.
4. Prior interrogations should be tape recorded. Orne, supra note 42, at 335-36.
The Hurd court adopted a modified version of these safeguards. The court agreed that only
a psychiatrist or psychologist "experienced in the use of hypnosis" should conduct the session.
86 N.J. at 545, 432 A.2d at 96. Requiring the hypnotist to be independent from the prosecu-
tor, investigator, or defense would eliminate any possible bias on the part of the hypnotist. Id.,
432 A.2d at 96. Recording of information given to the hypnotist prior to the session would
help determine what information the hypnotist could have communicated to the witness. Id.
at 546, 432 A.2d at 96. Prior to hypnosis, the subject should give the hypnotist the facts as the
subject remembers them. Id., 432 A.2d at 96. Only the hypnotist and the subject should be
present during all phases of the session and the session should be recorded. Id., 432 A.2d at
97.
103. In addition to the hypnotist and subject, two police officers and a medical student
attended the hypnotic session. Hurd, 86 N.J. at 530, 432 A.2d at 88. Moreover, one of the
officers questioned the subject during the session, id. at 531, 432 A.2d at 89, and no one made a
record of what either the hypnotist or the subject knew prior to the session. Id. at 548-49, 432
A.2d at 98.
104. Id. at 549, 432 A.2d at 98. Interestingly, in 1977, before the court decided Hurd,
Oregon enacted procedural safeguards for the admissibility of hypnotically induced testimony.
Act of July 20, 1977, ch. 540, § 1, 1977 Or. Laws 469 (codified as amended at OR. REV. STAT.
§ 136.675 (1985)). Before the state may use the testimony of a witness who agrees to hypnosis,
the statute requires that the entire procedure be recorded. Id.
105. 86 N.J. at 543, 432 A.2d at 95.
106. Some commentators assert that because ordinary eyewitness recall, which generally is
admissible, is plagued with problems similar to those found in hypnotic recall, the courts also
should admit hypnotic recall. See Buckhout, Eyewitness Testimony, 231 Sci. AM. 23, 25
(1974); Spector & Foster, supra note 40, at 584; Comment, Hypnosis-Should the Courts Snap
Out of It?-A Closer Look at the Critical Issues, 44 OHiO ST. L.J. 1053, 1068-71 (1983); Note,
supra note 40, at 509-15; Note, Did Your Eyes Deceive You? Expert Psychological Testimony
on the Unreliability of Eyewitness Identification, 29 STAN. L. REV. 969, 976-89 (1977) [herein-
after Note, Did Your Eyes Deceive You?]. Others assert that problems in eyewitness testimony
are heightened in the hypnotized subject and thus, the two types of recall are not analogous.
See, e.g., Diamond, supra note 44, at 342.
107. Buckhout, supra note 106, at 27.
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ble."' s These characteristics of ordinary recall parallel the confabulation
problem of hypnotic recall.
Moreover, just as commentators have criticized hypnotically induced tes-
timony because the subject may be unable to distinguish between matters of
fact and fantasy, the ordinary eyewitness likewise "may be unaware he is
distorting or reconstructing his memory."' ' 9 Because of the manner in
which the mind combines information learned about an event, a witness may
have difficulty distinguishing between matters originally seen and informa-
tion later discovered." ° In addition, the court must consider the witness'
motive at the time of the crime in determining whether the witness reported
events that he desired to see."' Although psychologists agree that eyewit-
ness testimony may be inaccurate and unreliable," 2 the trier of fact nonethe-
less may consider this testimony because safeguards, such as the opportunity
for cross-examination, combat its dangers." 3 Commentators have suggested
that the courts should apply similar standards of scrutiny to both types of
recall: "[e]ither more rigorous standards for ordinary eyewitness testimony
should be applied or standards for the admissibility of hypnotically refreshed
testimony should be relaxed." "
Those opposing the use of hypnotically induced testimony find inappropri-
ate the analogy of hypnotically induced recall to ordinary eyewitness recall.
According to this view, the two types of recall are dissimilar because the
hypnotized subject is much more susceptible to suggestion than is the eye-
witness and the hypnotized distortions are greater." 5 The difference be-
tween eyewitness and hypnotic recall, then, is one of degree: "some
unreliable distortions" may exist in ordinary recall, however "inevitable dis-
tortions" exist in hypnotic recall." 6
Additionally, courts have criticized Hurd's procedural safeguards as inef-
fective.' ' The California Supreme Court observed that the Hurd safeguards
are incomplete, because although hypnosis produces many dangers, the safe-
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. Note, Did Your Eyes Deceive You?, supra note 106, at 983.
111. Buckhout, supra note 106, at 26.
112. See Spector & Foster, supra note 40, at 584.
113. Id. One commentator complains that although similar problems are recognized in
both forms of recall, the problems in hypnotic recall are "amplified and associated exclusively
with the hypnotic process itself." Comment, supra note 106, at 1071.
114. Note, supra note 40, at 515.
115. See, e.g., Diamond, supra note 44, at 342.
116. Id.
117. See, e.g., People v. Shirley, 31 Cal. 3d 18, 39, 641 P.2d 775, 787, 181 Cal. Rptr. 243,
255, cert. denied, 458 U.S. 1125 (1982).
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guards address only the heightened suggestibility risk of hypnosis.1" 8 The
United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit observed that even if
parties use all the Hurd safeguards, the safeguards cannot guarantee that
hypnosis has not "irreparably distorted" 9 the witness' memory. Moreover,
if parties employ flawed safeguards, the fact-finder nonetheless may believe
that the use of safeguards insulated the hypnotic process from danger and
may place undue weight on that testimony.' 2 ' Critics further assert that
because tone of voice and body language can relay suggestions, a Written
transcript of the session may mislead the jury, for the transcript does not
display these suggestions.' 2' For some critics, even a videotape recording of
the hypnotic session may mislead the jury because the subject may behave
differently if he knows he is being taped.' 2 2 Those who look with disfavor
on the procedural safeguard approach to the admissibility of posthypnotic
testimony turn instead to the inadmissible per se view.
C. Per Se Inadmissibility: The Frye Test
Recent judicial reaction to the question of admissibility has favored total
exclusion of posthypnotic testimony.' 23 Cases rejecting Harding attack the
witness' competency to testify and assert that before a witness may testify to
118. Id. at 39, 641 P.2d at 787, 181 Cal. Rptr. at 255. This court criticized the Hurd
safeguards because they fail to protect against the subject's loss of critical judgment, the sub-
ject's inability to distinguish fact from fantasy, and the subject's increased confidence in his
recollection. Id., 641 P.2d at 787, 181 Cal. Rptr. at 255.
119. McQueen v. Garrison, 814 F.2d 951, 958 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 332
(1987).
120. Id. Because hypnosis is not within a juror's common experience, critics fear that the
jury will place "absolute reliability" on hypnosis without considering its problems. See
Spector & Foster, supra note 40, at 583.
121. See Diamond, supra note 44, at 339.
122. See id.
123. The following state cases hold that hypnotically induced testimony is inadmissible per
se: Contreras v. State, 718 P.2d 129 (Alaska 1986); State v. Mena, 128 Ariz. 226, 624 P.2d
1274 (1981); People v. Shirley, 31 Cal. 3d 18, 641 P.2d 775, 181 Cal. Rptr. 243, cert. denied,
458 U.S. 1125 (1982); State v. Atwood, 39 Conn. Supp. 273, 479 A.2d 258 (1984); Bundy v.
State, 471 So. 2d 9 (Fla. 1985), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 295 (1986); Strong v. State, 435 N.E.2d
969 (Ind. 1982); State v. Haislip, 237 Kan. 461, 701 P.2d 909. cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1022
(1985); Collins v. State, 52 Md. App, 186, 447 A.2d 1272 (1982); Polk v. State, 48 Md. App.
382, 427 A.2d 1041 (1981); Commonwealth v. Kater, 388 Mass. 519,447 N.E.2d 1190 (1983);
People v. Gonzales, 415 Mich. 615, 329 N.W.2d 743 (1982); State v. Mack, 292 N.W.2d 764
(Minn. 1980); State v. Palmer, 210 Neb. 206, 313 N.W.2d 648 (1981), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct.
206 (1987); State v. Peoples, 311 N.C. 515, 319 S.E.2d 177 (1984).
Most of these cases do not render the hypnotized witness completely incompetent to testify,
but rather limit the testimony to matters disclosed prior to hypnosis. Cf Shirley, 31 Cal. 3d at
67, 641 P.2d at 805, 181 Cal. Rptr. at 273 (a previously hypnotized witness is incompetent to
testify to any matters relating to the subject of the hypnotic session).
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information retrieved through hypnosis, the scientific community first must
accept hypnosis as a reliable means of recalling memory.
This general acceptance standard emerged from a 1923 federal case, Frye
v. United States. 124 In Frye, the jury convicted the defendant of second de-
gree murder. Prior to trial, the defendant agreed to take a systolic blood
pressure deception test. 125 The defense offered the administrator of the test
as an expert witness to testify about the test's results. 126 The court, however,
disallowed the expert's testimony because scientists had not recognized the
reliability of this test. The court held that the scientific principle about
which the expert testifies "must be sufficiently established to have gained
general acceptance in the particular field in which it belongs."' 127 The Frye
test balances the prejudice of admitting the testimony against the probative
value of that testimony.2 In Frye, the court disallowed the testimony be-
cause the probative value was low and the prejudice in favor of the defendant
was high. Thus, courts that hold hypnotically induced testimony inadmissi-
ble per se assert that hypnosis is a scientific process similar to the polygraph,
and because no general acceptance exists as to the reliability of hypnosis,
testimony derived therefrom is inadmissible.
129
The leading case that follows this view is People v. Shirley. 130 In that case,
a rape victim sought to testify to posthypnotic recollections. The trial court
allowed her testimony, but the California Supreme Court reversed.' 3' The
court rejected both the Harding and Hurd approaches, 3 2 and instead fol-
lowed those decisions invoking Frye. ' In a concurring and dissenting opin-
124. 293 F. 1013 (App. D.C. 1923).
125. Id. This test, which measures a person's blood pressure, is premised on the theory
that more effort is required in conscious deception, and thus when a person lies, his blood
pressure increases. Id. at 1013-14.
126. Id. at 1014.
127. Id.
128. See Contreras v. State, 718 P.2d 129, 135 (Alaska 1986). This balancing approach is
codified in FED. R. EvID. 403: "Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative
value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or
misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless presenta-
tion of cumulative evidence." Id.
129. The Minnesota Supreme Court was the first to apply Frye's "general acceptance" test
to hypnosis in State v. Mack, 292 N.W.2d 764 (Minn. 1980). There, the court commented that
"[a]lthough hypnotically adduced 'memory' is not strictly analogous to the results of mechani-
cal testing, we are persuaded that the Frye rule is equally applicable." Id. at 768.
130. 31 Cal. 3d 18, 641 P.2d 775, 181 Cal. Rptr. 243, cert. denied, 458 U.S. 1125 (1982).
131. Id. at 72, 641 P.2d at 808, 181 Cal. Rptr. at 276.
132. The court rejected the Harding approach because Harding failed to observe the dan-
gers of hypnosis. Id. at 36, 641 P.2d at 785, 181 Cal. Rptr. at 253. Also, the court found
Hurd's safeguards inadequate. Id. at 39, 641 P.2d at 786-87, 181 Cal. Rptr. at 255.
133. Id. at 54, 641 P.2d at 796, 181 Cal. Rptr. at 265.
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ion, Judge Kaus rejected the majority's "sweeping, 'per se' rule"'134 and
urged an individual case inquiry into the circumstances surrounding the
hypnotic session.1 35 The dissent agreed with Hurd that a per se inadmissible
rule would exclude potentially reliable evidence. 136 Thus, the dissent would
have employed Hurd's "more cautious approach"'' 37 and would have ex-
amined the facts of the particular case.
The Shirley court based its decision largely upon the opinion of one ex-
pert, Dr. Diamond. 38 According to Diamond, the pretrial hypnosis of a
witness renders the potential witness "incompetent"'' 39 to testify. Because
the reliability of hypnosis is questionable, so too is the veracity of matters
recalled during or relating to a hypnotic session. This view prevents the
witness from testifying to posthypnotic recall and, likewise, restricts the wit-
ness from testifying to matters recalled prior to hypnosis. Such is the effect
of Shirley's sweeping per se rule.' 4
As illustrated, the attitude of the courts toward the admissibility of hyp-
notic evidence has changed recently. For example, in Collins v. State, 141 the
Maryland Court of Special Appeals overruled the per se admissible approach
adopted in Harding, noting that in the years following Harding, a contro-
versy arose concerning the scientific justification for admitting hypnotically
induced testimony. 42 Rather than addressing hypnotically induced testi-
mony as a matter of credibility, the court adopted the Frye test and held that
because the scientific community did not accept the reliability of hypnosis to
refresh memory, such testimony was inadmissible. 43 The Maryland Court
of Special Appeals adhered to the Shirley court's analysis and barred wit-
nesses from testifying to matters relating to the hypnotic session.'" The
134. Id. at 74, 641 P.2d at 809, 181 Cal. Rptr. at 277 (Kaus, J., concurring and dissenting).
135. Id., 641 P.2d at 809, 181 Cal. Rptr. at 277-78 (Kaus, J., concurring and dissenting).
136. Id. at 76, 641 P.2d at 810, 181 Cal. Rptr. at 278 (Kaus, J., concurring and dissenting).
137. Id. at 77, 641 P.2d at 811, 181 Cal. Rptr. at 279 (Kaus, J., concurring and dissenting).
138. Id. at 63 n.45, 641 P.2d at 802 n.45, 181 Cal. Rptr. at 270 n.45.
139. Diamond, supra note 44, at 332. Diamond asserts that the fact that the witness was
hypnotized "destroy[s] the probative value of any evidence that the witness might otherwise
have been able to produce." Id.
140. In a subsequent opinion, the Shirley court modified its decision and included an excep-
tion for defendants: "[W]hen it is the defendant himself-not merely a defense witness--who
submits to pretrial hypnosis, the experience will not render his testimony inadmissible if he
elects to take the stand. In that case, the rule we adopt herein is subject to a necessary excep-
tion to avoid impairing the fundamental right of an accused to testify in his own behalf."
People v. Shirley, 31 Cal. 3d 18, 67, 723 P.2d 1354, 1384, 181 Cal. Rptr. 243, 273, cert. denied,
458 U.S. 1125 (1982).
141. 52 Md. App. 186, 447 A.2d 1272 (1982).
142. Id. at 196, 447 A.2d at 1278.
143. Id. at 205, 447 A.2d at 1283.
144. Id., 447 A.2d at 1283.
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Maryland high court, however, rather than rendering the previously hypno-
tized witness incompetent to testify, allowed the witness to testify to matters
recalled and related prior to hypnosis.' 4 ' Only posthypnotic testimony,
then, would be inadmissible per se. 146
As more courts applied the Frye test to hypnosis, controversy arose as to
whether courts should apply this test to the hypnotic process. The cases
invoking Frye to exclude posthypnotic testimony suggest that hypnosis is
similar to other types of scientific tests, 14 7 such as the polygraph test and
narcoanalysis. 4 ' Thus, the same rationale for disallowing evidence obtained
from these tests, that they lack scientific acceptance, also applies to hypnosis.
However, because Frye is factually distinguishable from most cases seeking
to introduce a witness' hypnotically induced testimony, the commentators
have criticized the application of the Frye test to hypnosis.149 In Frye, the
subject of the scientific testing did not attempt to testify; rather the prosecu-
tion objected to the testimony of the expert interpreting the polygraph re-
sults.15 ° The Frye rule, then, arguably applies to the testimony of the
hypnotist rather than that of the subject, yet courts nonetheless invoke this
test to hold inadmissible even the subject's testimony.' 5 ' Proponents of this
rule argue that the Frye test has expanded to include the subject's testimony
because of the inseparability of the technique's final product, the testimony,
from the scientific test, the hypnosis.
52
The application of the Frye analysis to hypnosis also has drawn criticism
because hypnosis is "conceptually different" from other scientific tests to
which Frye traditionally applies.' 53 The purpose of using hypnosis differs
from that of other types of tests. Unlike the polygraph or truth serum tests,
which measure factual truth, hypnosis is a device for "retrieving relevant
testimony previously forgotten or psychologically suppressed regardless of
145. State v. Collins, 296 Md. 670, 702, 464 A.2d 1028, 1044 (1983).
146. The North Carolina Supreme Court applied the Collins analysis in State v. Peoples,
311 N.C. 515, 531-32, 319 S.E.2d 177, 187 (1984), which overruled State v. McQueen, 295
N.C. 96, 244 S.E.2d 414 (1978). The court noted that at the time of McQueen, it was not
aware of the problems inherent in hypnosis. Peoples, 311 N.C. at 519, 319 S.E.2d at 180.
Thus, the court limited the testimony to facts related prior to hypnosis. Id. at 533, 319 S.E.2d
at 188.
147. See Alderman & Barrette, supra note 72, at 23-24.
148. Comment, supra note 37, at 127-28. Narcoanalysis is the truth serum test.
149. Note, Pretrial Hypnosis and Its Effect on Witness Competency in Criminal Trials, 62
NEB. L. REv. 336, 351-52 (1983); Note, supra note 40, at 518; see also United States v. Valdez,
722 F.2d 1196, 1200-01 (5th Cir. 1984) (the Frye test applies to expert opinion and experimen-
tal data).
150. See supra notes 125-27 and accompanying text.
151. See supra note 123.
152. Ruffra, supra note 59, at 317.
153. See Note, supra note 149, at 352.
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the factual truth or falsity of that testimony.""5 4 Commentators suggest that
because hypnosis does not attempt to establish scientific facts or data, courts
should not evaluate its reliability according to a standard that requires per-
fect results."' 5 Instead, courts ought to leave the reliability assessment of
hypnosis for the jury's determination. 56
D. The Federal Approach
In contrast to the varied approaches among the states concerning the ad-
missibility of hypnotically induced testimony, the federal courts initially
were consistent in their treatment of such testimony and adhered to the Har-
ding approach that hypnosis affects credibility, not admissibility.' 7 More
recently, however, the federal trend favors an individual case inquiry rather
than a per se rule of either admissibility or inadmissibility. 8 This individ-
ual inquiry requires a balancing of the possible unfair prejudice to the de-
fendant if the testimony is admitted, against the testimony's probative value
if it is exluded.' 59 For the federal courts, a per se rule excluding hypnoti-
cally induced testimony would destroy the investigatory benefits that "re-
sponsible" hypnosis may produce.' " In addition, the federal courts
recognize the need for a "factual analysis on a case-by-case basis."' 61 Thus,
while the federal courts reject the Hurd guidelines as a "litmus test for deter-
mining the reliability of pre-trial hypnosis,"' 62 they adopt a "middle
ground"' 63 analysis, namely admission of hypnotically induced testimony in
a particular case, in an effort to admit all reliable evidence."'
E. Posthypnotic Testimony of a Defendant
In the majority of cases addressing the admissibility of hypnotically in-
154. Spector & Foster, supra note 40, at 584.
155. See Note, supra note 149, at 352.
156. Falk, supra note 59, at 51.
157. See supra note 85 and accompanying text.
158. See McQueen v. Garrison, 814 F.2d 951 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 332 (1987);
United States v. Kimberlin, 805 F.2d 210 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 3270 (1987);
Harker v. Maryland, 800 F.2d 437 (4th Cir. 1986); Wicker v. McCotter, 783 F.2d 487 (5th
Cir.), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 3310 (1986); United States v. Valdez, 722 F.2d 1196 (5th Cir.
1984).
159. See Valdez, 722 F.2d at 1201; see also supra note 128 and accompanying text (discuss-
ing the balancing approach of FED. R. EVID. 403).
160. See Harker, 800 F.2d at 441.
161. McQueen, 814 F.2d at 958.
162. Id.
163. Id. at 956.
164. This federal trend is distinguishable from the trend among the states to disallow such
testimony as per se inadmissible. See, e.g., People v. Shirley, 31 Cal. 3d 18, 641 P.2d 775, 181
Cal. Rptr. 243, cert. denied, 458 U.S. 1125 (1982).
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duced testimony, the testimony in question was that of either a witness to or
a victim of the crime, not that of the accused.165 In the cases where the
defendant had undergone hypnosis, however, the questions before the court
included whether the defendant should have undergone hypnosis 166 or
whether the defendant could have testified while under hypnosis, 167 rather
than whether the defendant's posthypnotic testimony was admissible.
In Cornell v. Superior Court, 168 the California Supreme Court allowed the
defense to use hypnosis in the preparation of its case, 6 9 however the court
did not discuss the question of the admissibility of testimony derived from
this hypnosis. In Greenfield v. Robinson, 7 0 the United States District Court
for the Western District of Virginia found no error in the trial court's disal-
lowing the defendant's request to testify while under hypnosis.' 7 ' Again, the
question was not one of admissibility, and the court followed the general rule
of disallowing in-court hypnosis.'
72
Moreover, in State v. Atwood, 3 the Connecticut Superior Court denied
the defendant's request to admit posthypnotic testimony should the defend-
ant eventually undergo hypnosis. 174 The court denied the motion because
hypnosis did not pass Frye's test of general acceptance in the scientific
community. 171
Both state and federal courts have given widespread attention to whether
a witness or a victim may testify to posthypnotic recollections. These same
courts, however, have given little consideration to the admissibility of a de-
fendant's posthypnotic testimony. With Rock v. Arkansas' 76 the Supreme
Court distinguished between these two lines of cases and required a different
analysis when a state evidentiary rule limits a defendant's testimony.
165. See cases cited supra notes 85, 97, 123.
166. See Cornell v. Superior Court, 52 Cal. 2d 99, 338 P.2d 447 (1959).
167. See Greenfield v. Robinson, 413 F. Supp. 1113 (W.D. Va. 1976).
168. 52 Cal. 2d 99, 338 P.2d 447 (1959).
169. Id. at 104, 338 P.2d at 449.
170. 413 F. Supp. 1113 (W.D. Va. 1976).
171. Id. at 1117.
172. Because there was no eyewitness and little evidence suggesting that the defendant did
not commit the crime, the court prevented the defendant from testifying while under hypnosis.
Id. at 1120; see also supra note 70. However, in an unreported case a defendant under hypo-
nosis was allowed to testify. H. ARONS, supra note 36, at 106-08 (discussing State v. Nebb,
No. 39,540 (Ohio C.P., Franklin County, May 28, 1962)).
173. 39 Conn. Supp. 273, 479 A.2d 258 (1984).
174. Id. at 283, 479 A.2d at 265.
175. Id. at 284, 479 A.2d at 264.
176. 107 S. Ct. 2704 (1987).
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III. ROCK V. ARKANSAS: AN INDIVIDUAL INQUIRY
The much-debated issue of the admissibility of hypnotically induced testi-
mony finally reached the United States Supreme Court in Rock v. Arkan-
sas. "' In this case, the Court retreated from the stringent majority view of
per se inadmissibility and instead announced a rule of individual inquiry into
the circumstances of each case. In reaching its conclusion, the Court per-
formed a balancing test to determine whether the purpose of a state's eviden-
tiary rule justifies the limit the rule places upon the defendant's right to
present his defense. 7 Through this decision, the Court broadened the use
of hypnosis in the courtroom, thereby denouncing the inadmissible per se
rule as an arbitrary restriction on relevant and reliable evidence.
In its analysis of a defendant's fundamental right to present a defense,
179
the Court pointed to three sections of the federal Constitution that support
this right: the fourteenth amendment, the sixth amendment, and the fifth
amendment. The Court reasoned that a mandate of due process includes "a
right to be heard and to offer testimony."'' ° Further, the Court relied on
the defendant's sixth amendment right to call witnesses in the defendant's
favor, in this case the defendant herself,' to determine the defendant's right
to testify.' 82 Lastly, the Court deemed the right to testify a "necessary co-
rollary" to the fifth amendment's guarantee against self-incrimination." 3
Because the defendant may choose to remain silent by invoking the fifth
amendment, the Court asserted, so too may he invoke the fifth amendment
177. Id.
178. Id. at 2711-12.
179. Id. at 2708-10. The Court discussed the transformation from the common law rule of
defendant incompetency to the statutory rule of defendant competency. At common law,
criminal defendants were deemed incompetent to testify. The courts were concerned that be-
cause defendants were interested in the outcome of the trial, the defendants' motivation was
suspect. Id. at 2708-09. Yet, because allowing the defendant to testify aids in the "detection of
guilt" and the "protection of innocence," this rule of incompetency gave way to a rule of
defendant competency. Id. See generally Ferguson v. Georgia, 365 U.S. 570, 573-82 (1961)
(discussing the history of the transformation from the common law rule to the rule of defend-
ant competency). Moreover, the Court noted that Arkansas' Constitution guarantees an ac-
cused the right to testify, ARK. CONST. art. II, § 10, and that rule 601 of the Arkansas Rules of
Evidence, ARK. STAT. ANN. § 28-1001 (1979), provides a general rule of competency: "Every
person is competent to be a witness except as otherwise provided in these rules." Id.; Rock,
107 S. Ct. at 2708 n.6.
180. Rock, 107 S. Ct. at 2709.
181. Id. The pertinent part of the sixth amendment states that an accused shall "have
compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor." U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
182. Rock, 107 S. Ct. at 2709. The Court asserted that "the most important witness for the
defense in many criminal cases is the defendant himself." Id.
183. Id. at 2710.
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as a right to speak.1 14 Thus, because the Constitution supports the defend-
ant's right to testify, the Court closely scrutinized Arkansas' ban on the de-
fendant's posthypnotic testimony.
Although the Court recognized a defendant's right to present testimony, it
also recognized that states may impose certain limits on that right through
their own rules of evidence and procedure. '" These rules, however, may not
"arbitrarily exclude" testimony.'8 6 In evaluating Arkansas' rule of evi-
dence,'8 7 the Court relied on its reasoning in Chambers v. Mississippi. 188
There, the Court struck down a state's hearsay rule because it conflicted
with the defendant's right to "present witnesses in his own defense."' 8 9
When a state's evidentiary rule conflicts with a defendant's right to present
witnesses, the Chambers Court held that due process requires that the rule
may "not be applied mechanistically to defeat the ends of justice." ' Like-
wise in Rock, rather than an automatic application of Arkansas' inadmissi-
ble per se rule, the Court suggested a balancing approach to determine the
legitimacy of the interest embodied in the state rule. According to the
Court, the state "must evaluate whether the interests served by a rule justify
the limitation imposed on the defendant's constitutional right to testify."''
Although the Court recognized the state's "legitimate interest in barring un-
reliable evidence,"' 92 it nonetheless rendered Arkansas' inadmissible per se
rule an "arbitrary restriction on the right to testify"' 9 3 because hypnotically
induced testimony is not necessarily unreliable.' 94
The Court criticized the Arkansas Supreme Court's reliance on Shirley to
justify an inadmissible per se rule, for in so doing, the Arkansas court failed
to perform the proper constitutional analysis.'9" Unlike the Arkansas
Supreme Court ruling, which limited the testimony of a criminal defendant,
the rule announced in Shirley limited the testimony of a witness."96 In fact,
184. Id.
185. Id. at 2711.
186. Id.
187. Arkansas had a rule of per se inadmissibility of posthypnotic testimony. See supra
note 20 and accompanying text.
188. 410 U.S. 284 (1973).
189. Rock, 107 S. Ct. at 2711 (quoting Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 302 (1973)).
In Chambers, the state's hearsay rule prevented Chambers from introducing as evidence the
confessions of the real murderer. Id.
190. Id. (quoting Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 302 (1973)).
191. Id.
192. Id. at 2714.
193. Id.
194. See infra notes 208-14 and accompanying text.
195. Rock, 107 S. Ct. at 2712.
196. People v. Shirley, 31 Cal. 3d 18, 23, 641 P.2d 775, 804, 181 Cal. Rptr. 243, 245, cert.
denied, 458 U.S. 1125 (1982).
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the Shirley court necessarily excepted defendants from this inadmissible per
se rule and recognized that such a rule would inhibit the defendant's right to
testify.197 The Arkansas Supreme Court conceded that the defendant's right
to testify is "fundamental," '98 however the court asserted that because
"standard rules of evidence' ' 99 restricted the defendant's testimony, such a
limit was permissible.2°" The state court, like the Supreme Court, performed
a balancing test, yet the Supreme Court implied that the state court weighed
the wrong factors. The state court weighed the risk of unreliability against
the probative value of the testimony.2"1 The Supreme Court's balancing test,
on the other hand, weighed the danger of unreliability against the limit on
the defendant's right to testify, rather than the probative value of that testi-
mony.20 2 Thus, the Supreme Court found the state court's analysis faulty
because the state court "simply followed ' 20 3 the inadmissible per se cases
without fully examining the ramifications of limiting the defendant's right to
testify.
In addition, the Court invalidated Arkansas' per se rule because the rule
renders hypnotically induced testimony inherently unreliable without con-
sidering whether such testimony may be reliable in an individual case. 2°4
The Court recognized the proferred dangers of hypnosis, such as suggestibil-
ity, production of inaccurate memories, confabulation, and an increased con-
fidence in the subject's responses.20 5 In fact, the Court justified the exclusion
of such testimony where a party proved that, in a given case, the testimony
was so unreliable as to outweigh its probative value.206 Thus, the Court
rejected Harding's automatically admissible approach. According to the
Court, because scientific understanding of hypnosis and procedures to con-
trol the effects of hypnosis still are developing,2 7 a per se admissible rule
may result in the admission of unreliable evidence, a risk that the Court was
unwilling to take.
Just as the Court refused to follow an admissible per se rule for fear that
the trial court would admit unreliable evidence, so too did the Court hesitate
in accepting an inadmissible per se rule for fear that the trial court would
197. See supra note 140 and accompanying text.
198. Rock v. State, 288 Ark. 566, 578, 708 S.W.2d 78, 84 (1986).
199. Id. at 579, 708 S.W.2d at 86.
200. Id. at 580, 708 S.W.2d at 86.
201. Id. at 573, 708 S.W.2d at 81.
202. See Rock v. Arkansas, 107 S. Ct. 2704, 2711 (1987).
203. Id. at 2712.
204. Id. at 2711-12.
205. Id. at 2713.
206. Id. at 2714.
207. Id.
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exclude reliable evidence. The Court rejected the inadmissible per se rule
because the Court noted that many factors may reduce the risks of hypnosis.
The Court pointed to a modified version of the Hurd safeguards as one way
to reduce the risk of unreliability.20 8 Unlike the Shirley court's requirement
of absolute scientific accuracy of the hypnotic process, the Rock Court rec-
ognized that these guidelines do not guarantee accuracy of the hypnotically
induced testimony, 2' but rather "provide a means of controlling overt sug-
gestions, )210 and by controlling suggestion, the accuracy of the hypnotically
induced testimony increases. Thus, because the inadmissible per se rule de-
mands absolute accuracy of the hypnotic process, the Supreme Court re-
jected the cases supporting this rule.
Moreover, unlike the supporters of the inadmissible per se rule, the Court
found merit in the "traditional means"2"' available to test the veracity of
testimony and therefore to reduce the risk of unreliability of posthypnotic
testimony. Even if the defendant experienced increased confidence as a re-
sult of hypnosis, the Court rejected the contention that hypnosis bars effec-
212tive cross-examination. Just as the prosecution may detect testimonial
inconsistencies in a nonhypnotized witness, so too may the prosecution test
for inaccuracies in a defendant who agreed to hypnosis. The Court also
found that the use of corroborating evidence was an additional means of
proving the accuracy of hypnotically induced testimony.21 3 Lastly, the
Court suggested that expert testimony and jury instructions could be used to
apprise the jury of the risks involved in the hypnotic process. 214 Because the
parties and counsel may reduce the risks and increase the reliability of hyp-
notically induced testimony through these techniques, the Court rejected the
inadmissible per se rule.
To determine the accuracy of the petitioner's hypnotic recall, the Court
208. Id. The Court asserted that the hypnotic session ought to follow these procedural
guidelines to reduce suggestion:
1. A psychologist or psychiatrist with special training in the use of hypnosis and independent
from the investigation should conduct the hypnosis.
2. The psychologist or psychiatrist should conduct the hypnosis in a "neutral setting" with
only the hypnotist and subject present.
3. The parties should tape or video record all interviews before, during, and after the hypno-
sis to determine whether the hypnotist asked any leading questions. Id.
209. The Court acknowledged that these safeguards cannot guarantee accuracy because the
procedures fail to control the subject's motivations and tendency to confabulate. Id.
210. Id.
211. Id. The Court considered cross-examination, corroborating evidence, expert testi-






looked to the circumstances of the case. Through hypnosis, Rock recalled
that she did not have her finger on the trigger and that the gun discharged
when her husband hit her arm.2" 5 The Court noted that the gun expert's
testimony as to the gun's defective condition corroborated what the peti-
tioner recalled under hypnosis.216 Moreover, the hypnotic process incorpo-
rated safeguards,217 which further added to the reliability of the recall.
Under these conditions, the majority held that the Arkansas court should
not have limited the petitioner's testimony. The state's interest in reliable
testimony did not justify the per se inadmissible rule, because hypnotically
induced testimony is not necessarily unreliable. In adhering to a case-by-
case determination, the Supreme Court adopted both the dissenting opinion
in Shirley2" 8 and the approach more recently seen in the lower federal
courts.
2 1 9
All members of the Court did not agree with the majority's constitutional
analysis. The dissent recognized that because due process is flexible, coun-
tervailing considerations may outweigh an individual's right to present evi-
dence without depriving the individual of due process.220 The dissent saw
Arkansas' rule as a reasonable restriction on an individual's right to present
evidence.221 In concluding that this limit did not violate petitioner's due
process rights, the dissent balanced the petitioner's interest in presenting a
defense against the state's interest in reliable evidence. 222 Because experts
have not fully developed procedures to control the effects of hypnosis, 22 3 the
state's interest outweighed the petitioner's and therefore, the dissent would
have limited Rock's testimony.
215. Id. at 2707.
216. Id. The Court asserted that had the trial court allowed Rock to testify to her recollec-
tion that her finger was not on the trigger and that the gun fired when her husband hit her, the
gun expert's testimony would have taken on greater significance. Id. at 2712.
217. Id. at 2706-07. A licensed neuropsychologist hypnotized the petitioner twice and re-
corded both sessions. Id.
218. See supra notes 134-37 and accompanying text.
219. See supra note 158 and accompanying text. The Court also noted that the state has
"the power to enact guidelines for determining how to evaluate posthypnotic testimony."
Rock, 107 S. Ct. at 2714. Thus, the Court encouraged the state legislatures to follow Oregon's
lead and establish statutory procedural safeguards. Id.; see also supra note 104.
220. Rock, 107 S. Ct. at 2716 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
221. Id. at 2715-16 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
222. Id. at 2716 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting). In support of its proposition, the dissent
cited Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970), where the Court balanced whether the private
interest "in avoiding [loss of welfare payments] outweighed the governmental interest in sum-
mary adjudication." Id. at 263. The Rock dissent suggested that the individual interest in
Goldberg v. Kelly, loss of life, was greater than that in Rock v. Arkansas, loss of liberty, and
therefore Rock was not entitled to as much due process as was the individual in Goldberg v.
Kelly. Rock, 107 S. Ct. at 2716 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
223. Rock, 107 S. Ct. at 2715 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
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The dissent further criticized the majority's view that admitting the de-
fendant's posthypnotic testimony aids in the advancement of truth,224 and
suggested that "advancement of the truth-seeking function of Rock's trial
was the sole motivation behind limiting her testimony."22 For the dissent,
hypnosis produces "inherently unreliable ' 226 evidence because the subject is
prone to confabulation and suggestion, and therefore admitting such testi-
mony would not result in reliable evidence.227 Moreover, because hypnosis
produces heightened confidence, the dissent disagreed with the majority's
view that cross-examination can effectively test the accuracy of the testi-
mony. 228 The dissent did not engage in a case-by-case analysis and did not
look at the circumstances of the case. Rather, the dissent determined that
because hypnosis produced unreliable evidence, courts should not admit any
posthypnotic testimony. Thus, the dissent adopted the Frye view and as-
serted that until the scientific and legal worlds arrive at a "more general
consensus on the use of hypnosis, ,229 the majority's individual inquiry anal-
ysis would remain untenable.
IV. EFFECT OF ROCK v. ARKANSAS ON FUTURE CASES
A. Rock's Effect on Criminal Defendants
Rock's individual inquiry approach admits a criminal defendant's post-
hypnotic testimony where the parties show particular signs of reliability
through corroborating evidence and procedures controlling suggestion.23 °
Because Rock broadens the use of hypnosis in criminal cases, courts no
longer may deny an accused the opportunity to undergo hypnosis and must
look at the circumstances of each case to determine the reliability and, there-
fore, admissibility of the evidence the hypnosis produces.
Applying Rock's rule to Cornell v. Superior Court, 231 where the California
Superior Court allowed the defense to use hypnosis in preparing its case
232
but did not decide the issue of admissibility, Rock modifies Cornell. In Cor-
nell, the court allowed the defense attorney to question the defendant with
the help of a hypnotist. 233 One of Rock's suggested procedural protections is
224. Id. (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
225. Id. (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
226. Id. (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
227. Id. (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
228. Id. (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
229. Id. at 2716 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
230. Id. at 2714.
231. 52 Cal. 2d 99, 338 P.2d 447 (1959).
232. See supra text accompanying note 169.
233. 52 Cal. 2d at 104, 338 P.2d at 450.
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that only the hypnotist should question the subject,234 and therefore the par-
ties failed to meet one of the preferred safeguards. In addition, there was
evidence of hypnotist bias,23 another factor adding to the unreliability of
the hypnosis in Cornell. Despite these flaws in the hypnotic procedure, how-
ever, the court should examine whether corroborating evidence existed and
whether the prosecution cross-examined the defendant, because procedural
safeguards are only part of the Rock formula. Thus, if other evidence of
reliability exists to overcome these flawed procedural safeguards, then the
court must allow not only the hypnosis, it also must allow any evidence
derived therefrom.
In expanding the use of hypnotically induced testimony in criminal cases,
Rock also limited the holding of State v. Atwood.236 In Atwood, the Connect-
icut Superior Court followed the Frye test in denying the defendant's motion
to admit his hypnotically induced testimony if he agreed to hypnosis. 237 Be-
cause Rock demands an individual inquiry to determine if signs of reliability
in the hypnotic process exist, courts no longer can apply Frye's blanket ex-
clusionary rule to a defendant's posthypnotic testimony. Although Rock
does not overrule Frye, Rock does suggest that Frye does not apply to hypno-
sis238 and therefore, courts no longer can rely on Frye.
B. Rock's Effect on Civil Defendants and Victims:
How Far Does Rock Extend?
Although Rock has broadened the use of hypnosis, the decision has led to
the question of just how far Rock's rule extends.239 For example, would the
Court have reached the same conclusion if this were a civil case? Because
the Court based its decision on the criminal defendant's constitutional right
to testify, the individual inquiry approach probably would not extend to a
civil case. 2" Due process extends to civil parties where the state may de-
prive an individual of property.241  However, the deprivation of property
probably is not as strong an interest as the deprivation of life or liberty and,
therefore, the state's interest in reliable evidence probably will prevail in civil
cases.
234. 107 S. Ct. at 2714.
235. In Cornell, the defense attorney had seen the hypnotist work with other subjects and
specifically requested him to conduct his client's hypnosis. 52 Cal. 2d at 101, 338 P.2d at 448.
236. 39 Conn. Supp. 273, 479 A.2d 258 (1984).
237. See supra text accompanying notes 173-75.
238. 107 S. Ct. at 2714.
239. See Stewart, Hypnotized Witnesses, Loaded Jurors, 73 A.B.A. J. 54, 54 (1987).
240. See id. at 56. Stewart suggests that because the Court based its decision in part on the
fifth and sixth amendments, this decision applies only in criminal cases.
241. See, e.g., Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 264 (1970).
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Another question that Rock provokes is whether its rule should extend to
the testimony of victims or witnesses. Had Arkansas' rule limited the testi-
mony of a victim or witness, the Court probably would have allowed the
limitation. The victim's interest in apprehending the assailant probably is
not as significant as the private interest of the accused, that is, the possible
deprivation of his life or liberty. If Rock's policy does extend to victims or
witnesses, however, courts must engage in Rock's analysis to determine
whether the hypnotically induced testimony is admissible.
Applying Rock's rule to the three trend-setting pre-Rock cases, Har-
ding, 242 Hurd, 243 and Shirley, 2 " Rock affirms the results, but applies a dif-
ferent analysis. In Harding, the parties used procedural safeguards, such as
having a psychologist conduct the hypnosis, 245 however there was no evi-
dence that the parties recorded the session. Another sign of reliability was
that evidence corroborated the victim's posthypnotic testimony.24 6 Also, be-
cause she took the stand, the defense had an opportunity to cross-examine
the victim. Lastly, the trial judge gave jury instructions warning the jury not
to give the posthypnotic testimony any more weight than any of the other
evidence. 24 7 Thus, applying the Rock analysis to the Harding facts results in
a concurrence: the same result, admitting the testimony, but for a different
reason. Unlike the Harding rule, the holding in Rock does not let the jury
weigh the posthypnotic testimony unless signs of reliability in the hypnosis
exist. Because signs of reliability exist under the Harding facts, the Court
would admit this testimony if Rock's rule extends to victims.
Likewise, an application of Rock to the facts of Hurd results in the same
outcome that the Hurd court rendered. In Hurd, a psychologist conducted
the hypnosis, but two police officers and a medical student also were present,
and one of the officers asked the victim questions during the hypnotic ses-
sion, 2 4 contrary to Rock's procedural requirements. In addition, the relia-
bility of the victim's posthypnotic testimony was weakened because there
was no other corroborating evidence. 249 Thus, while the Hurd court disal-
lowed the testimony because of lack of procedural safeguards, the Rock rule
242. 5 Md. App. 230, 246 A.2d 302 (1968), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 949 (1969).
243. 86 N.J. 525, 432 A.2d 86 (1981).
244. 31 Cal. 3d 18, 641 P.2d 775, 181 Cal. Rptr. 243, cert. denied, 458 U.S. 1125 (1982).
245. 5 Md. App. at 235-36, 246 A.2d at 306.
246. Id. at 247, 246 A.2d at 312. During her posthypnotic testimony, the victim revealed
that the defendant had raped her and upon examination, doctors found sperm in her vagina.
Id., 246 A.2d at 312.
247. Id. at 244, 246 A.2d at 310.
248. 86 N.J. 525, 530-31, 432 A.2d 86, 88 (1981).
249. 86 N.J. at 549, 432 A.2d at 98.
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looks for other signs of reliability. Because there are no signs of reliability,
the Rock rule also would disallow this testimony.
Lastly, applying Rock to the Shirley facts results in the same end, but
because Shirley invoked Frye to restrict the testimony25° the Rock rule again
requires a different analysis. The procedural safeguards the parties used in
Shirley were flawed because the parties conducted the session in the presence
of people beside the hypnotist and subject.251 As in Hurd, the posthypnotic
testimony was the only evidence that incriminated the defendant,252 and the
lack of corroborating evidence weakened the reliability of the victim's post-
hypnotic testimony. Under these facts, because the parties did not show the
reliability of hypnosis, the Rock Court also would have disallowed this
testimony.
As this analysis illustrates, Rock's liberal rule probably does not extend to
victims or witnesses. Unless signs of reliability exist, such as those similar to
the Harding facts, victims and witnesses probably will be prevented from
testifying to their posthypnotic recollections. The Rock policy affording due
process to individuals who have a great private interest at stake probably will
not extend to victims or witnesses unless their interest is as grave as the
deprivation of life or liberty, which faces the criminally accused. Thus, Rock
indeed is a significant decision for criminal defendants.253
C. Possible Problems in Applying Rock's Rule
Whether the Rock rule will lead to uniform results is a question that re-
mains unanswered. Unlike the objective standard of the Frye general accept-
ance test, Rock's individual inquiry test is a subjective standard. Under
Frye, if the scientific community generally accepts the scientific test, the re-
sults of that test are admissible; if the scientific community does not accept
the test, the results are inadmissible.254 Under the Rock analysis, however,
the test is a subjective examination of the surrounding circumstances in an
250. See supra text accompanying notes 130-33.
251. 31 Cal. 3d 18, 29, 641 P.2d 775, 780, 181 Cal. Rptr. 243, 248, cert. denied, 458 U.S.
1125 (1982).
252. Id. at 70, 641 P.2d at 806, 181 Cal. Rptr. at 275.
253. The Court expressly denied any opinion on whether the same analysis applies to any
matter other than a criminal defendant's posthypnotic testimony. "This case does not involve
the admissibility of testimony of previously hypnotized witnesses other than criminal defend-
ants and we express no opinion on that issue." Rock v. Arkansas, 107 S. Ct. 2704, 2712 n.15
(1987).
According to a study of the Supreme Court's decisions in the 1986-1987 Term, Rock was
one of three criminal cases representing a "significant victor[y]" for criminal defendants.
Whitebread & Heilman, The Counterrevolution in Criminal Procedure, 9 NAT'L L.J., Aug. 17,
1987, at S-7.
254. Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013, 1014 (App. D.C. 1923).
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individual case. Such an analysis may lead to a lack of uniformity in deci-
sions because no specific test exists to assess the reliability of such testimony.
Subsequent cases may combat the lack of uniformity by adhering to the
specific signs of reliability the Rock Court examined: procedural safeguards,
cross-examination, and corroborating evidence. 2" The Rock Court, how-
ever, did not announce a litmus test for determining reliability of hypnosis,
and therefore intended some fluidity in examining the defendant's pos-
thypnotic testimony. If Rock does result in a lack of uniformity, the ends,
the admissibility of the testimony, justify the means, the hypnotic procedure,
as long as the parties can point to some signs of reliability.
V. CONCLUSION
The question of whether to admit hypnotically induced testimony has led
to inconsistency in the state courts. The early cases held that hypnosis went
to credibility, not admissibility, and established a rule of admissibility per se.
As courts recognized the dangers inherent in the hypnotic process and ques-
tioned its reliability, many allowed the admission of posthypnotic testimony
only if parties employed procedural safeguards. Still other courts held that
because hypnosis generally was not accepted as reliable in the scientific com-
munity, posthypnotic testimony was inadmissible per se. The lower federal
courts adopted yet another approach, that of a case-by-case examination into
the circumstances surrounding the hypnosis.
In Rock v. Arkansas, the Supreme Court expanded the use of criminal
defendants' posthypnotic testimony and conducted an individual inquiry to
determine if, in a given case, testimony resulting from hypnosis might be
reliable. In its analysis, the Court weighed the state's interest in barring
untrustworthy evidence against the defendant's right to present his defense,
and on balance, concluded that the defendant's constitutional right to testify
outweighed the state's interest where hypnosis is proven reliable in an indi-
vidual case. The Rock approach rejected both Harding and Shirley, and
modified Hurd's safeguards. Although this individual inquiry analysis is a
subjective one that may lead to a variety of outcomes, it nonetheless is the
appropriate approach in light of the private interest the defendant risks; the
deprivation of life or liberty without the opportunity to present testimony in
his defense.
Kimberly A. Genua
255. 107 S. Ct. at 2714.
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